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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE POSTAL SERVICE'S
SUBSCRIBER REQUIREMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS WITH DENYING EQUAL ACCESS TO THE
POSTAL SYSTEM
Elizabeth Gorman*
INTRODUCTION
Second-class mail has long enjoyed the most favorable postage
rates offered by the Postal Service for the transportation and de-
livery of mail.1 These low rates are made available to second-class
mail, which includes most newspapers and periodicals, for the pur-
pose of encouraging public dissemination of information and
ideas.2 However, second-class mail rates are available only to pub-
43
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1. See Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 151, 154 (1946) (discussion of low rates for
second-class mail); United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v.
Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 410 (1921) (justification for second-class rates). A classification sys-
tem for mailable matter was first instituted with the Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 71, § 19, 12
Stat. 701, 704-05. The classification system was revised in § 7 of the Act of Mar. 3, 1879, ch.
180, 20 Stat. 355, 358. With the Postal Service Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
375, 84 Stat. 719 (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. §§ 101 - 5605 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)),
Congress delegated its classification and ratemaking authority to the Postal Service. See 39
U.S.C. § 3621 (1982). Congress also established the Postal Rate Commission to recommend
proposed rate and classification changes to the Postal Service's Board of Governors. See id.
§§ 3601, 3622. Current effective classifications and rates are set forth in the UNITED STATES
POSTAL SERVICE DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL, which is incorporated into the Postal Service regu-
lations by reference at 39 C.F.R. § 111.1 (1986).
2. The purpose of encouraging public dissemination of information and ideas was not evi-
dent in the original legislation instituting the lower second-class mailing rate. Section 20 of
the 1863 Act accorded second-class privileges to "all mailable matter exclusively in print,
and regularly issued at stated periods, without addition by writing, mark, or sign." Act of
Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 71, § 20, 12 Stat. 705. The 1879 Act, however, restricted second-class privi-
leges to publications "originated and published for the dissemination of information of a
public character, or devoted to literature, the sciences, arts or some special industry." Act of
Mar. 3, 1879, ch. 180, § 14, 20 Stat. 359.
During the debates preceding the passage of the 1879 Act, several members of Congress
indicated that the lower second-class rates were to be made available with the goal of bene-
fitting the public by encouraging the communication of news and ideas. 8 CONG. REc. 696-97
(1879); 7 CONG. REc. 4025-27 (1878). One member of the House Postal Committee explained
that "the reason for which papers are allowed to go at a low rate of postage. . . is because
they are the most efficient educators of our people. It is because they go into general circula-
tion and are intended for dissemination of useful knowledge such as will promote the pros-
perity and the best interests of the people . . . ." 8 CONG. REc. 2135 (1879) (statement of
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lications that distribute one-half or more of all circulated copies
either to paying subscribers' or to persons who have requested that
the publication be sent to them.4 A publication that distributes
Rep. Money). In interpreting the 1879 Act, the Supreme Court expressly recognized that
Congress intended the lower second-class rates to provide an incentive for the distribution
of periodicals conveying educational information and ideas. See Hannegan, 327 U.S. at 154-
55; Burleson, 255 U.S. at 410. That purpose was carried over into the mail classification
system established by the Postal Service Reorganization Act of 1970.
In § 8(c) of the 1970 Act, the Postal Commission's recommendations concerning changes
in the mail classification schedule are directed to be made in accordance with several speci-
fied factors. 39 U.S.C. § 3623(c) (1982). One of those factors is "the relative value to the
people of the kind of mail matter entered into the postal system." Id. Exercising its author-
ity under the statute, the Postal Service has promulgated regulations providing that all gen-
eral publications eligible for second-class rates "must be originated and published for the
purpose of disseminating information of a public character or they must be devoted to liter-
ature, the sciences, art, or some special industry." UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE DOMESTIC
MAIL MANUAL § 422.21 (1985) (incorporated by reference at 39 C.F.R. § 111.1 (1986)) [here-
inafter DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL]. The language of the regulation is almost identical to that
of § 14 of the 1879 statute. Act of Mar. 3, 1879, ch. 180, § 14, 20 Stat. 359.
3. Section 422.221 of the DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL, supra note 2, provides in relevant part:
List of Subscribers. General publications must have a legitimate list of subscribers
who have paid or promised to pay, at a rate above a nominal rate, for copies to be
received during a stated time. Persons whose subscriptions are obtained at a nominal
rate shall not be included as a part of the legitimate list of subscribers. Copies sent in
fulfillment of subscriptions obtained at a nominal rate must be charged with postage
at regular rates ....
Section 422.223 of the DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL, supra note 2, provides:
Free or Nominal Rate Circulation. Publications primarily designed for free circula-
tion and/or circulation at nominal rates may not qualify for the general publications
category. Publications are considered primarily designed for free circulation and/or
circulation at nominal rates when one-half or more of all copies circulated are pro-
vided free of charge to the ultimate recipients, or are paid for at nominal rates by the
ultimate recipients, or when other evidence indicates that the intent of the publisher
is to circulate the publication free and/or at nominal rates. The distribution of all
copies of a publication is considered, whether circulated in the mails or otherwise.
4. Section 422.6 of the DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL, supra note 2, provides in relevant part:
Requester Publications. A publication ... is eligible for authorization to mail at
[second-class rates] if it meets . . . all of the following requirements:
a. Each issue must contain at least 24 pages...
b. No issue may contain more than 75 percent advertising ...
c. The publication must not be owned or controlled by one or more individuals or
business concerns . . . for the advancement of the main business or calling of those
who own or control it; and
d. [T]he publication must have a legitimate list of persons who request the publi-
cation, and 50 percent or more of the copies of the publication must be distributed to
persons making such requests. Subscription copies paid for or promised to be paid for
• ..may be included in the determination of whether the 50 percent request require-
ment is met. Persons will not be deemed to have requested the publication if their
request is induced by a premium offer or by receipt of material consideration. Re-
quests which are more than three years old will not be considered to meet this
requirement.
Hereinafter, all three regulations will be referred to together as the "subscriber require-
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more than half of its copies free of charge to persons who have not
specifically requested copies is not eligible for the second-class rate
and must pay the higher third-class rate.6 Because of these re-
quirements, many local weekly newspapers that are delivered by
mail to all the members of a community are denied the lower sec-
ond-class rates. Groups hoping to win converts to a political cause
or religious faith are also barred from using the subsidized rate to
mail unsolicited publications.
In determining whether the postal regulations containing the
subscriber requirement infringe first amendment rights, two con-
stitutional questions must be examined: (1) the existence of a right
of access to government property for expressive purposes; and (2)
the appropriate standard for denying access to that property.
While the national postal system is a medium of communication, it
is also a form of property consisting of a complex web of facilities
and services. Arguably, the denial of a second-class mailing rate
violates the first amendment because the first amendment gives to
every member of the public what is essentially a form of property
right-the right to use the facilities and services of the postal sys-
tem to increase the reach of his or her speech.' The contrary view,
ment." These regulations continue and amplify the subscriber requirement included in § 14
of the 1879 Act, which provided that second-class mailing status would be available only to
publications "having a legitimate list of subscribers. Nothing herein contained shall be so
construed as to admit to the second-class rate regular publications designed . . . for free
circulation, or for circulation at nominal rates." Act of Mar. 3, 1879, ch. 180, § 14, 20 Stat.
359.
5. DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL, supra note 2, at § 422.6(d).
6. See infra notes 10-53 and accompanying text. Like other provisions of the Constitu-
tion, the first amendment defines what are in essence property rights. By protecting free-
doms which are exercised through the use of property, the first amendment protects the
freedom to use one's property as one chooses, provided the use is expressive. Thus, in
Wooley v. Maynard, the Supreme Court held that the first amendment protected an indi-
vidual's right to cover up the state motto printed on his automobile license plates. 430 U.S.
705 (1977). Effectively, the decision constitutionalized the individual's right, as a property
owner, to control the use of his license plate-at least insofar as his use of the license plate
involved speech. Similarly, in Spence v. Washington, the Court held that the first amend-
ment protected a flag owner's right to display a peace symbol taped to his flag, emphasizing
that "this was a privately owned flag. . .displayed . .. on private property." 418 U.S. 405,
408-09 (1974). Again, the decision preserved the owner's dominion over his flag against state
attempts to alter his property rights.
In two cases, the Supreme Court held that the first amendment protected a private prop-
erty owner's right to exclude others from his property. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, the Court struck down a state law requiring newspaper publishers to provide space
for political candidates to respond to the newspaper's criticisms as a violation of the first
amendment. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). More recently, in Pacific & Elec. Co. v. Public Util.
Comm'n., the Court invalidated a California Public Utilities Commission order which re-
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that the denial of a reduced rate merely involves a discretionary
decision allocating government largesse, denies the existence of
such an access right.
This article argues that the postal regulations that contain the
subscriber requirement do indeed infringe upon the constitution-
ally protected rights of publications that are distributed through
the mails to nonsubscribing recipients. Part I argues that the sub-
scriber requirement implicates the first amendment because the
first amendment creates a right to use the postal system that is
restricted by the imposition of higher rates for certain categories of
mail.7 Part II argues that a demanding standard of judicial scru-
tiny should be applied to the regulations because they create a
content-based distinction.' Part III applies this higher standard of
review and concludes that the regulations fail to meet that
standard.'
quired a private utility to include messages from a consumer organization in its billing enve-
lopes. 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986). The decision effectively gave constitutional protection to the
utility's interest in excluding others from its property. The Court made it clear, however, in
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins that the first amendment permits a property owner
to exclude others from his property only where the use of the property by others would
hinder the property owner's speech or expression. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). In PruneYard, the
Court refused to invalidate a provision of the California Constitution which had been inter-
preted by the California Supreme Court to require shopping center owners to permit peace-
ful expressive activity by others in the open areas of the shopping center. The Supreme
Court reached this decision because there was no showing that such expressive activity in-
terfered with the property owner's speech. Id. at 85-88.
Prior to the decision in PruneYard, the Court had interpreted the first amendment to
defeat a private property owner's right to exclude others by creating a right in the public to
use privately owned shopping center property for speech purposes. See Amalgamated Food
Employees' Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968). However, in a
short period of time the Court changed its mind and rejected the idea of a first amendment
"easement" on shopping center property. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 517-21
(1976) (expressly overruling Logan Valley). For further discussion of the first amendment as
the source of constitutionally defined property rights, see Dorsen & Gora, Free Speech,
Property and the Burger Court: Old Values, New Balances, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 195 (1983);
Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097 (1981);
Oakes, "Property Rights" in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV. 583 (1981);
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982); Van Alstyne, The Recrudes-
cence of Property Rights as the Foremost Principle of Civil Liberties, 43 LAW & CONTFMP.
PROBs. 66 (1980).
7. See infra notes 10-53 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 54-86 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 87-111 and accompanying text.
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I. THE IMPLICATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS: THE
SUBSCRIBER REQUIREMENT RESTRICTS ACCESS TO A PUBLIC FORUM
In analyzing the denial of second-class rates to publications
without subscribers, the threshold question is whether that denial
presents a first amendment issue. This question is important be-
cause its answer determines the level of judicial scrutiny to which
the postal regulations must be subjected. If the regulations restrict
the first amendment rights of nonsubscriber publications, the regu-
lations must be evaluated according to one of a variety of levels of
heightened scrutiny.10
The Postal Service's subscriber requirement for second-class
postage rates denies a government benefit, i.e., access to the postal
system, to publications which do not meet the requirement and
thus must pay the higher third-class rate. Unlike measures which
directly restrain or prohibit the exercise of a constitutionally pro-
tected freedom through the imposition of sanctions, measures
which inhibit the exercise of constitutional freedoms through the
denial of government benefits do not always amount to restrictions
calling for judicial scrutiny. The courts have developed two doc-
10. First amendment jurisprudence is complicated by the fact that a number of different
standards of review have evolved on a case by case basis to deal with particular categories of
speech. If a restriction merely limits the time, place, or manner of speech without regard to
its content, the restriction will be upheld if it is narrowly drawn to serve a "significant"
government interest and leaves open ample alternative channels of communication. Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). If a restriction distinguishes some forms
of speech from others on the basis of content, the restriction is evaluated according to the
particular standard developed for the appropriate category of content, such as commercial
speech, obscenity, or speech intended to induce illegal conduct. If no particular standard has
evolved for the content category at issue, the restriction will be upheld only if it is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45; Carey
v. Brown, 477 U.S. 455, 464-65 (1979); see infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
If first amendment rights are not implicated, the only alternative basis for judicial review
of the regulations is the equal protection component of the fifth amendment due process
clause. Because the regulations do not establish a suspect classification, review under the
equal protection clause is limited to the deferential "rational basis" standard. Absent a sus-
pect classification, inequalities in the distribution of government benefits will be reviewed
under the equal protection clause only for rationality. Regan v. Taxation With Representa-
tion, 461 U.S. 540, 547-50 (1983) (applying rationality review to an Internal Revenue Code
provision that granted a tax benefit to some charitable organizations engaged in political
lobbying while denying the benefit to other charitable organizations); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 322-24 (1980) (applying rationality review to law providing Medicaid funding for
childbirth but not for abortion). Because the rationality standard is easier to satisfy than a
higher level of scrutiny, the postal regulations are much more likely to survive an equal
protection challenge than an attack on first amendment grounds.
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trines under which the denial of government benefits can amount
to a violation of constitutional rights: the penalty doctrine and the
public forum doctrine.
A. The Inapplicability of the Penalty Doctrine
The denial of a government benefit infringes upon constitution-
ally protected rights when the denial penalizes the exercise of
those rights.1 The government may not condition the receipt of a
benefit upon the relinquishment of a constitutionally protected
freedom 2 because such a denial effectually imposes a sanction on
the exercise of the freedom, just as if the law imposed a fine or
imprisonment for its exercise.' 3 Thus, it is unconstitutional for the
government to deny public employment 14 or property tax exemp-
tions' 5 to individuals who express disfavored views, or welfare ben-
efits to persons who have exercised their protected right to travel
to a new state,16 or unemployment benefits to persons who practice
their religion by refusing to work on Saturdays. 7
However, the Supreme Court has stated that the denial of a gov-
ernment benefit is not a penalty on the exercise of a constitutional
right when the denied benefit merely subsidizes the exercise of the
right." The denial of a benefit only constitutes a penalty when the
11. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
12. The penalty doctrine has also been called the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
because the denial of benefits occurs as a condition of the individual's exercise of a constitu-
tionally protected freedom. See Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S.
583, 592-94 (1926); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-8, at 510 (1978).
13. In Perry, the Court explained that:
even though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit and even
though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there
are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit
to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected inter-
ests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny
a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations,
his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.
408 U.S. at 597.
14. Id.; Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
15. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
16. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
17. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
18. "A refusal to fund protected activity, without more, cannot be equated with the impo-
sition of a 'penalty' on that activity." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980); see
also Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 543 (1983) (no penalty where
"Congress has merely refused to pay for [the protected activity] out of public moneys");
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 n.8 (1977) (rejecting "the claim. . . that the State 'penal-
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denied benefit is broader than the resources needed to exercise the
right.19 For example, neither the denial of tax deductions for ex-
penses incurred" or contributions made21 to influence the enact-
ment of legislation nor the denial of federal financing for political
campaigns 2 constitutes a penalty on first amendment rights. Simi-
larly, the Court has held that a federal statute barring Medicaid
funding for abortions was not a penalty on the exercise of a consti-
tutional right,2" although the Court noted that a denial of all Medi-
izes' the woman's decision to have an abortion by refusing to pay for it."). In Regan, for
example, the Court held that there is no first amendment right to government subsidization
of political lobbying efforts. 461 U.S. at 545-46. The Court explained that "[t]his Court has
never held that Congress must grant a benefit ... to a person who wishes to exercise a
constitutional right .... We again reject the 'notion that first amendment rights are some-
how not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State.'" Id. (quoting Cammarano v.
United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
The Court has made the same point in the context of other constitutionally protected
freedoms. In McRae, the Court held that the denial of Medicaid funding for abortions does
not impinge on the "liberty" protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment,
although that liberty concededly includes the freedom to terminate a pregnancy. 448 U.S. at
312-18. The Court observed that:
it simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries with it a constitu-
tional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of pro-
tected choices. . . .[A]Ithough government may not place obstacles in the path of a
woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own
creation. Indigency falls in the latter category.
Id. at 316.
The one exception to this rule appears in the context of access to the judicial process. The
Supreme Court has held that the right to procedural due process is violated when the gov-
ernment refuses to pay for counsel for indigent criminal defendants, Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), or for a trial transcript that
is necessary to pursue a criminal appeal, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The require-
ment that the government subsidize certain court-related costs was extended to civil litiga-
tion in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). In Boddie, the Court found that Con-
necticut violated the due process clause when it denied judicial access to indigents who were
unable to pay the court fees required to obtain a divorce.
However, later cases have largely limited Boddie to its facts. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410
U.S. 656 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). The Supreme Court has refused
to recognize a general right to government subsidization of the costs of civil process. Instead,
the Court has limited the right to government payment of litigation costs to cases which
bear on a distinct, substantive fundamental right, such as marriage or divorce, and where
adjudication provides the only available means of resolving the dispute. See Ortwein, 410
U.S. 656; Kras, 409 U.S. 434.
19. For example, in Maher, 432 U.S. at 475 n.8, the Court explained that a state's refusal
to pay the bus fares of indigent travelers would not penalize the right of interstate travel.
However, in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), and Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Court held that a state's denial of all welfare benefits to
persons who had recently traveled across state lines penalized the exercise of that right.
20. See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 512-13 (1959).
21. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 545.
22. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976).
23. McRae, 448 U.S. at 312-18.
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caid benefits to women who chose to have an abortion would con-
stitute such a penalty.24 In the first amendment context, then, as a
general rule, if the denial of a benefit simply involves a refusal to
subsidize expression and does not sweep more broadly to take
away other benefits, the denial does not raise a constitutional
issue.25
The implicit rationale for the Court's distinction between a pen-
alty and a refusal to subsidize seems to be that by taking away a
benefit that the individual otherwise would have possessed had he
not exercised his constitutionally protected freedom, the govern-
ment imposes a penalty on that freedom. The penalty is similar in
nature, if not always in degree, to the levying of a fine or the depri-
vation of personal liberty by imprisonment. Alternatively, the gov-
ernment's refusal to subsidize the exercise of a protected freedom
does not take anything away from the individual that he otherwise
would have possessed. Instead, the government simply declines to
give the individual something "more."26
By denying second-class postage rates to publications without
24. Id. at 317 n.19.
25. This general rule appears to be true even if a refusal to subsidize speech is based on
the content of the speech. See Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir.)
(no first amendment violation in state arts commission's decision to deny grant to literary
magazine based on offensive nature of magazine's content), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894
(1976). Yet potential dangers inhere in allowing the government unbridled discretion to dis-
criminate on the basis of content in the public funding of speech. Government-funded ideas
and viewpoints could become more widely publicized and more readily accepted than other
ideas and viewpoints. Thus, competing ideas effectively could be drowned out. Aspects of
this problem are discussed in Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15
GA. L. REv. 795 (1981); Gottlieb, Government Allocation of First Amendment Resources, 41
U. Pirr. L. REV. 205 (1980); Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Govern-
ment Expression and the First Amendment, 57 Tax. L. REv. 863 (1979).
26. Viewed in that light, the Court's distinction conforms with its traditional attitude
toward the nature of constitutionally protected freedoms. Freedom of expression, like all
freedoms, may be viewed in two ways. In negative terms, it can be thought of as freedom
from government-imposed restraints on private speech. This view of freedom of expression
assumes that the speaker has access to private means of communication. But the negative
view of freedom is an empty one to persons who lack such private means and consequently
are unable to communicate effectively even in the absence of government restraints. The
second view of freedom of expression encompasses the notion of an affirmative government
obligation to provide a means of communication to those who lack the private resources
necessary to express themselves. Under this view, freedom of speech only exists in a mean-
ingful way when an effective medium of expression is available to those who lack private
methods of communication. Therefore, the government's obligation to protect freedom of
speech must include the furnishing of such a medium.
This second view has never been accepted by the Supreme Court. It is clear that, at least
as the law now stands, there is no general first amendment right to government-provided
means of communication or to government subsidization of the costs of expression.
[Vol. 21:541
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subscribers, the Postal Service has simply refused to subsidize
those publications' expressive activities. Because the publications
suffer no broader consequences, the subscriber requirement em-
bodied in the Postal Service's regulations does not impose a pen-
alty on protected speech. In the absence of some other constitu-
tional doctrine, the Postal Service's subscriber requirement for
subsidized mailing rates would not implicate first amendment
concerns.
B. The Postal System As a Public Forum
In cases which develop the public forum doctrine, the denial of
what is in fact a subsidy for the exercise of free speech has been
held to impinge upon first amendment rights. The public forum
doctrine establishes a type of constitutional property right: the
right to use certain government-owned property under certain cir-
cumstances for the purpose of expression." The public forum doc-
trine thus defines the circumstances in which the government has
an affirmative obligation under the first amendment to make avail-
able the means of communication. 29 The government has an af-
firmative obligation to make available property to the public that
is characterized as a public forum; 30 it has no obligation to provide
property that is not a public forum."1
27. An exemption from, or reduction in, a fee or tax is the equivalent of a cash subsidy.
See Regan, 461 U.S. at 544 ("Both tax exemptions and tax deductability are a form of
subsidy .... A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization
of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its income."); Follett v. Town of McCormick,
321 U.S. 573, 580-81 (1944) (Roberts, Frankfurter, & Jackson, JJ., dissenting) (a tax exemp-
tion is a "subsidy" which allows the taxpayer to "save the contribution for the cost of gov-
ernment which everyone else will have to pay.").
28. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (student religious groups could not
be excluded from use of university facilities); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (rule requiring that solicitation be restricted to
certain areas did not deprive group of public forum); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Con-
rad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (because municipal theaters were public forums dedicated to ex-
pressive activities, city could not prevent theatrical production company from using theaters
without first following certain procedural safeguards designed to prevent censorship);
Grayned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding use of public streets for peace-
ful demonstrations); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (distribution of hand bills
allowed on public streets); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (right to
peaceful assembly on public streets); see also supra note 6 (discussion of property rights
that arise from constitutional freedoms).
29. In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., the Court explained that it
has "adopted a forum analysis as a means of determining when the Government's interest in
limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wish-
ing to use the property for other purposes." 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3448 (1985).
30. See supra note 28.
31. See, e.g., Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. 3439; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators
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The system of mail transportation and delivery operated by the
United States Postal Service can be characterized as a public fo-
rum. Although no Supreme Court decision has squarely addressed
the issue, the public character of the postal system is assumed im-
plicitly in several Supreme Court cases.32 In these cases, the Court
applied levels of scrutiny that are appropriate where the use of a
public forum is restricted, but are not warranted where the govern-
ment property at issue is not a public forum. 33 Lower courts con-
fronting the issue have treated the postal system as a public
forum. 4
The postal system also falls neatly within the description of
"public forum" as developed in Supreme Court decisions. First, the
postal system clearly constitutes a "forum." The Supreme Court
recently held in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal and Educational De-
fense Fund, Inc.3 5 that the category of forums is not limited to
physical places or things, but extends to any activity or organiza-
tion that serves as a channel of communication. In Cornelius, the
Court held that the Combined Federal Campaign, a charitable
fund-raising drive carried on among federal employees, qualified as
a "forum. '36 The postal system would seem to fit even more com-
fortably within the meaning of a "channel of communication.
37
If the postal system is a forum, there can be little doubt that it
is a public forum. The Supreme Court has identified two kinds of
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S.
39 (1966).
32. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (considering validity
under first amendment of federal statute prohibiting mailing of unsolicited advertisements
for contraceptives); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971) (considering validity under first
amendment of federal statute authorizing Postmaster General to halt delivery of letters con-
taining payment for obscene materials); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S.
728 (1970) (considering validity under first amendment of federal statute permitting indi-
viduals to request Postmaster General to halt delivery of erotic materials); Lamont v. Post-
master General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (considering validity under first amendment of federal
statute authorizing Postmaster General to detain mail containing "communist political
propaganda").
33. See cases cited supra note 32.
34. See, e.g., Spencer v. Herdesty, 571 F. Supp. 444, 453 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Greengberg v.
Bolger, 497 F. Supp. 756, 776 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
35. 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3448-49 (1985).
36. Id.
37. In Perry Educ. Ass'n, the Supreme Court treated a public school's internal mail sys-
tem as a forum, although not a public one. 460 U.S. 37.
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public forums. Traditional public forums, such as streets and
parks, have historically been dedicated to public use for assembly
and communication.38 Nontraditional public forums include other
government facilities and services which have been opened to the
public for expressive activity. 9 The first kind of forum gains its
public character from long historical practice, 0 while the second
gains its public character from a deliberate government decision to
make its facilities available for public use.4 It seems indisputable
that the postal system falls within the second category of public
forum, because the government clearly has opened the postal sys-
tem to all members of the public for the purpose of communica-
tion. The postal system may fall within the first category of public
forum as well.42 Indeed, several Supreme Court justices have recog-
nized that the postal system is a public forum.43
38. See id. at 45; Schneider, 308 U.S. 147; Hague, 307 U.S. 496.
39. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37; Widmar, 454 U.S. 263 (university meeting facili-
ties); Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. 546 (municipal theater).
40. In Hague, the Court explained that streets and parks "have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." 307
U.S. at 515.
41. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 406 U.S. at 45.
42. The Supreme Court noted the long history of the postal system as a means of commu-
nication in United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114,
120-22 (1981). In his dissent in United States ex. rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publish-
ing Co. v. Burleson, Justice Holmes observed that "[tihe United States may give up the
Post Office when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much a
part of free speech as the right to use our tongues." 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
43. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns., 453 U.S. 114
(1981). In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan stated that "the mails ... are specifi-
cally used for the communication of information and ideas, and thus surely constitute a
public forum." Id. at 137-38 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice White, also concurring, noted
that "[t]here is no doubt that the postal system is a massive, Government-operated commu-
nications facility open to all forms of written expression protected by the First Amend-
ment." Id. at 141 (White, J., concurring). Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion, observed
that "[g]iven its pervasive and traditional use as a purveyor of written communication, the
Postal Service . . . may properly be viewed as a public forum." Id. at 148 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
The fact that the Postal Service charges a fee for the use of the postal system does not
alter its character as a public forum. The plurality opinion in Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), does not change the foregoing conclusion. In Lehman, a politi-
cian attacked the constitutionality of a municipal policy which refused to sell advertising
space on city buses for political advertising. 419 U.S. at 300. Four of the justices held that
the advertising space was not a public forum but was part of a commercial venture. Id. at
303. However, that analysis is inapplicable to the postal system because the postal system is
not primarily a commercial venture. The primary purpose of the postal system is to provide
the public service of transporting and delivering mail-a purpose which cannot be charac-
terized as commercial. By contrast, a municipality's sale of advertising space on its buses is
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C. Postage Rates Restrict the Use of a Public Forum
The requirement that a fee be paid to use the postal system for
communication amounts to a restriction on the use of a public fo-
rum for expression. The imposition of a fee or a tax on expression
constitutes a restriction on that expression. In Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, the Supreme Court observed that "[t]he power to tax the
exercise of a privilege is the power to control or supress its enjoy-
ment. Those who can tax the exercise of . . . [a privilege] can
make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources neces-
sary for its maintenance."'44 While the potentially restrictive char-
acter of fees or taxes is less obvious when they are set at reasona-
ble levels, the constitutional characterization of a fee or tax does
not depend upon the level at which it is set.45 A valid fee or tax
can be increased to the point where it significantly restricts the
exercise of the constitutionally protected freedom on which it is
imposed." Thus, a license tax on newspapers has been treated as a
restriction on freedom of speech,47 and a tax on the sale of reli-
gious books and pamphlets has been treated as a restriction on the
free exercise of religion.48 By limiting access to the postal system,49
wholly commercial because the sole purpose of such action is to bring in money for the
municipality. Postage rates, on the other hand, are not a revenue-raising mechanism but are
user fees which help defray the costs of the public service provided.
It should be noted, however, that it is unclear whether a majority of the Court in Lehman
thought that the advertising space was not a public forum. Justice Douglas' concurrence
relies more heavily on the interests of a captive audience as a rationale for upholding the
city ordinance than on the absence of a public forum. Id. at 305-08 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Moreover, at the time of this case, the Court had not yet fully developed public forum
analysis. Thus, the Lehman plurality apparently did not view the absence of a public forum
as all but dispositive on the issue of a first amendment violation, as the Court would do in
later cases. See Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. 3439; Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37; Council of
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114. Instead, the plurality went on to analyze the city's
justifications for its ordinance. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304. Because the concept of the public
forum has been refined over the past decade, it is not clear that the Court today would hold,
were it writing on a clean slate, that advertising space on public buses is not a public forum.
44. 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 326
(1819) ("An unlimited power to tax involves, necessarily, the power to destroy .... ").
45. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245 (1936).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 235.
48. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 112.
49. In a concurring opinion in United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'ns., Justice White observed that the requirement of a fee for access to the postal system
"measurably reduces the ability of various persons or organizations to communicate with
others." 453 U.S. 114, 141-42 (1981) (White, J., concurring); see also Spencer v. Herdesty,
571 F. Supp. 444, 452-53 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (Postage rates operate to "constrict the flow of
information [and] ideas.").
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postage rates similarly restrict the exercise of a constitutional
right, because access to the postal system is such a right under the
public forum doctrine.50
The foregoing analysis does not indicate that the Postal Service
violates the first amendment when it charges a fee for the use of its
services, but merely asserts that the imposition of such fees is sub-
ject to first amendment scrutiny. The requirement that postage be
paid is a content-neutral restriction that seems justified by the
government's need to raise revenues to support the system and by
the reasonableness of collecting those revenues from persons who
use the system.51
However, the postal regulations under examination 52 are dis-
criminatory because they establish different postage rates for pub-
lications with subscribers than for publications without subscrib-
ers. As a result, access to the postal system is more limited for one
class of publications than for the other. Because the postal system
is a public forum, the discriminatory aspect of these regulations
must be evaluated according to one of the heightened standards of
first amendment review rather than by the more lenient equal pro-
tection standard.5 3
II. DETERMINING THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REvIEw: THE
CONTENT-ORIENTATION OF THE SUBSCRIBER REQUIREMENT
A. The Effect of Public Forum Status on the Standard of Review
In the first amendment context, selecting the appropriate stan-
dard of review is a difficult task because the Supreme Court has
not articulated a clear principle for determining which of several
standards apply in any given case. At least one preliminary point
seems to be clear: the applicable standard of review is not affected
50. See supra notes 28-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the postal system as
a public forum.
51. Justice White reached exactly this conclusion in his concurrence in Council of Green-
burgh Civic Ass'ns. 453 U.S. at 141 (White, J., concurring). Because the appellees in Council
of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns sought to deposit material in letterboxes without paying postage
fees, Justice White viewed the case as a challenge to the requirement that postage be paid to
gain access to any part of the postal system. He concluded that the requirement was consti-
tutionally valid based on the "self-evident justification ... that the Government may insist
that those who use the mails contribute to the expense of maintaining and operating the
facility." Id.
52. See supra notes 3-4.
53. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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by the fact that the restriction on speech is effectuated through the
use of a public forum. The Supreme Court has explained that re-
strictions on access to or use of nontraditional public forums are
governed by the same constitutional standards that are applied to
restrictions on access to or use of traditional public forums.5' The
standards that govern restrictions on access to or use of traditional
public forums, such as streets and parks, are also those that govern
restrictions on speech in general, whether effectuated through pub-
lic or private means.5 Thus, a restriction on the use of the postal
system for purposes of speech must be evaluated under the same
standard as an equivalent restriction on the use of a street or park.
B. The Content Orientation of the Restriction Triggers the Ap-
plicable Standard of Review
The difficulty in determining the applicable standard of review
for the Postal Service's subscriber requirement stems from the Su-
preme Court's failure to articulate a clear principle for making
such a determination. The Court has not clearly identified a single
factor whose presence or absence triggers a certain standard of re-
view in first amendment cases. Instead, the Court has identified
two separate distinctions that must be considered in determining
the proper standard. First, the Court has drawn a distinction be-
tween government actions that discriminate against a particular
category of speech because of its content and government actions
that regulate speech without regard to its content.56 Second, the
Court has drawn a distinction between government actions that
completely prohibit expression and those that merely restrict the
time, place, and manner of expression.5" It is not clear which of
these two distinctions determines the applicable standard of
review.
54. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)
(describing identical standards for the two types of forum).
55. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294-95 (1984)
(applying general content-neutral standard to restriction of speech in public park); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460-63 (1980) (applying general content-based standard to restriction
of speech in public street).
56. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 209, 215 (1975); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S 92, 95-97 (1972);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concurring).
57. See Community for Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. at 294-95 (1984); Heffron v. In-
ternational Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
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The Court has tended to assume that the two distinctions are
necessarily correlated. It has assumed that content discrimination
goes hand in hand with a flat prohibition on expression, and that
content-neutrality goes hand in hand with a time, place, and man-
ner restriction. Thus, in Perry Education Association v. Perry Lo-
cal Educators' Association," the Court explained that a "content-
based exclusion" is governed by a strict standard of review, while
"regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which
are content-neutral" are governed by a more lenient standard.5 9
The problem with the Supreme Court's assumption is that the
two distinctions are not always correlated. Logically, a content-
neutral regulation must always be a time, place, and manner re-
striction. A content-neutral total prohibition would be absurd, be-
cause it would ban all speech. However, the reverse proposition is
not necessarily true. A time, place, and manner restriction need
not be content-neutral. It is possible for a legislature or agency to
frame a time, place, and manner restriction that focuses on speech
with a particular content. Likewise, a content-based restriction
need not be a total prohibition, although a total prohibition neces-
sarily must be content-based. Because of the Supreme Court's
faulty assumption, courts that have been confronted with content-
based time, place, and manner restrictions have exhibited some
confusion as to how to choose the appropriate standard of review.60
Despite the Court's failure to articulate a clear principle, the
analysis used by the Court in several cases suggests that the appli-
cable standard of review is determined by the content-orientation
of the restriction. 1 In several cases, the Court has been faced with
time, place, and manner restrictions that focused on particular
content-based categories of speech. In each case, the Court ana-
58. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
59. Id. at 45-46.
60. See, e.g., American Future Sys., Inc. v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 752 F.2d 854, 860-
63, 867-71 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3537 (1985); John Donnelly & Sons v.
Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1980), affd, 453 U.S. 916 (1981); see also Note, Time,
Place, and Manner Restrictions on Commercial Speech, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 127 (1983).
61. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (statute prohibiting mail-
ing of advertisements for contraceptives treated as content-based commercial speech restric-
tion); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (state university rule barring use of university
facilities by religious groups treated as content-based restriction); Metromedia, Inc. v. San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion) (city ordinance restricting use of billboards
for commercial messages treated as content-based commercial speech restriction); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (state statute prohibiting picketing near residences, except labor-dis-
pute picketing, treated as content-based restriction).
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lyzed the restriction according to the standards appropriate for
content-based regulations.6 2 The fact that no flat prohibitions were
involved did not alter the Court's analysis. Lower courts63 and
commentators 4 also have adopted the view that the content-orien-
tation of a restriction is the factor that triggers the appropriate
level of scrutiny. This approach makes sense in light of the basic
values underlying the first amendment. Any government discrimi-
nation on the basis of content is a matter of concern, whether it
involves a flat prohibition or a lesser restriction, because it places a
burden only on particular disfavored ideas or viewpoints. Such a
burden tends to impede the search for truth and the public's ca-
pacity for self-government by restraining the free flow of ideas and
information. 5 Therefore, all content-based restrictions should be
62. See cases cited supra note 61.
63. See e.g., American Future Sys., 752 F.2d at 863 (treating restriction on product sales
presentations in dormitories as content-based commercial speech restriction); Ad World,
Inc. v. Township of Doylestown, 510 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (treating restriction on
home delivery of advertising publication as content-based commercial speech restriction),
rev'd on other grounds, 672 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1982).
64. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 105-16 (1980); Stone, Restrictions on Speech
Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 81, 82 (1978); Note, supra note 60. According to one view, the content-based/content-
neutral distinction is important, not because content-based restrictions should receive more
searching scrutiny than content-neutral ones, but because scrutiny of content-based restric-
tions should take a different form. See J. ELY, supra, at 105-16. Because content-based
abridgments of speech are much more likely than content-neutral abridgments to be the
product of panic over a perceived threat, it is preferable to deal with content-based abridg-
ments through rigid "per se" constitutional rules that can withstand onslaughts of hysteria.
Id. For content-neutral restrictions, a more traditional ad hoc balancing approach is ade-
quate and, indeed, probably necessary to allow courts to respond to a wide variety of factual
situations. Id. at 110-16. The first part of this analysis echoes a view expressed by Justice
Learned Hand in a letter to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. Justice Hand wrote that
Once you admit that the matter is one of degree, you so obvioulsy make it a matter
of administration ... that the jig is at once up .... [WI]hat seems "immediate and
direct" to-day may seem very remote next year even though the circumstances sur-
rounding the utterance be unchanged. I own I should prefer a qualitative formula,
hard, conventional, difficult to evade. If it could become sacred by incrustations of
time and precedent it might be made to serve just a little to withhold the torrents of
passion to which ... democracies [are] subject.
Letter from Justice Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Jan. 21, 1921), quoted in Gun-
ther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Frag-
ments of History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719, 749-50 (1975).
65. One of the primary justifications for constitutional protection of freedom of expres-
sion is the belief that uninhibited debate on public issues will bring a society closer to the
ultimate truth. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing) ("[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market .. "); J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). Another important justifica-
tion for this constitutional protection is that freedom of public discussion will improve the
public's ability to govern itself, because free speech will produce an electorate that is better
556
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evaluated according to more rigorous standards than content-neu-
tral restrictions.
C. The Content-Orientation of Sections 422.6, 422.221 and
422.223 of the Domestic Mail Manual
Sections 422.6, 422.221, and 422.223 of the Domestic Mail Man-
ual, which embody the subscriber requirement for reduced mailing
rates, are facially content-neutral.6 Those regulations do not ex-
pressly identify a particular category of speech defined by its con-
tent in order to subject the speech to special burdens or benefits.
Nevertheless, the regulations do identify a category of speech
which is accorded special treatment. This category comprises pub-
lications which distribute at least half of their circulated copies to
paying subscribers or persons who have requested the publication.
Publications in this category are able to obtain a subsidized sec-
ond-class mailing rate. Thus, the critical inquiry is whether the
regulations, which appear on their face to be content-neutral, nev-
ertheless may be adjudged content-based if their purpose or effect
is to discriminate on the basis of content.6 " No Supreme Court de-
cision has addressed the proposition that the content-orientation
of a restriction may be determined on the basis of factors other
than the plain language of the restriction. Accordingly, it is unclear
whether the Court would permit such a determination and, if so,
what factors the Court would consider.6 "
informed and more thoughtful. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONS TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948), reprinted in A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 3-89 (1960).
66. See supra notes 3-4.
67. See L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at §§ 12-5 to -6 (courts should inquire into the legislative
motivations underlying facially neutral restrictions).
68. There is little help to be gleaned from the implicit holdings of the Supreme Court in
cases involving restrictions that arguably discriminated on the basis of content even though
the restrictions were facially content-neutral. In Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943), and Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 78 (1949), the Court was confronted with facially
content-neutral city ordinances that restricted the manner of expression. In Martin, the
ordinance prohibited door-to-door canvassing. 319 U.S. at 141. In Kovacs, the ordinance
restricted the use of loudspeakers and sound trucks on city streets. 336 U.S. at 78. In both
cases, the Court considered the contention that the ordinances restricted the expression of
ideas and viewpoints held by poorer people because both door-to-door convassing and the
use of sound trucks were relatively inexpensive methods of communication. Martin, 319
U.S. at 146; Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 88-89. To the extent poorer people may be expected to hold
ideas and viewpoints with a specific content, this restriction arguably could be a kind of
content discrimination.
However, the Court's response differed in the two cases. In Martin, the Court subjected
the ordinance to searching scrutiny but did not explain its reason for doing so. 319 U.S. at
146. In Kovacs, the plurality opinion applied a form of rationality review, explaining that
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1. The Analogy to Equal Protection Analysis
One approach that may be used to deterimine whether a facially
content-neutral restriction may be adjudged content-based is to
examine the method used to deal with a similar analytical problem
in the equal protection area. In determining whether a law violates
the equal protection clause, it is necessary to decide whether the
law is discriminatory, or, in other words, whether it creates a clas-
sification that leads to a difference in rights or privileges. A con-
tent-based restriction is one that discriminates between categories
of speech on the basis of their content. Deciding whether a facially
neutral speech restriction in fact discriminates on the basis of con-
tent is thus analogous to deciding whether a facially neutral mea-
sure in fact discriminates on the basis of race or sex.6 9
In the equal protection context, the Court has held that a regu-
lation may be considered to establish a suspect classification, and
therefore may be subjected to heightened scrutiny, even if it is
neutral on its face. 0 The existence of the implicit classification
must be established by showing that the provision has a differen-
tial impact on a particular group and that it was adopted by the
responsible government body for a discriminatory purpose. 1
the fact "[tlhat more people may be more easily and cheaply reached by sound trucks ... is
not enough to call forth constitutional protection for what those charged with the public
welfare reasonably think is a nuisance when easy [alternative] means of publicity are open."
336 U.S. at 88-89.
69. Professor Tribe has used the analogy to argue that the constitutional inquiry into
legislative motivation should be the same in both contexts. See L. TRIBE, supra note 12.
70. See Massachusetts Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 445 U.S. 901 (1980); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Griffin v. County
School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 344 U.S. 339 (1960).
71. Feeney, 445 U.S. 901; Davis, 426 U.S. 229. The Court has vacillated on the relevance
of legislative motivation to the determination of constitutional validity under the equal pro-
tection clause. In Griffin, 377 U.S. at 231-32, and Gomillion, 344 U.S. at 341-42, 347-48, the
Court emphasized the importance of motivation, warning that acts which would otherwise
be lawful may become unlawful when done for certain impermissible purposes. In Palmer,
however, the Court appeared to take a different view. In that case, the Court suggested that
legislative motivation is irrelevant to the equal protection decision. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224-
26. Yet the statements in Palmer must be viewed in the context of the case as a whole. A
municipality's closing of its public pools to blacks and whites alike was upheld against a
constitutional challenge primarily because the action was not discriminatory in effect. The
action did not create a suspect classification because it affected persons of both races in the
same way. Id. at 226. Where a law does not have a differential impact, the underlying gov-
ernmental motivation is correctly viewed as irrelevant. Essentially, Palmer stands for the
proposition that discriminatory purpose alone is not enough to violate the equal protection
clause; there must be a disparate effect as well. In later cases, the Court was faced with
government measures which had a disparate effect, but whose purposes were innocent. See
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Transferred to the first amendment context, this analysis suggests
that a facially neutral regulation should be found to create a con-
tent-based classification only if both its effect and its purpose are
to distinguish on the basis of content.
However, it is arguable that government motivation should not
play the same role in first amendment analysis that it does in
equal protection analysis. In the first amendment context, ideas
rather than people are the targets of distinctions and classifica-
tions. Thus, first amendment analysis implicates concerns that are
different from the interests involved in equal protection analysis.
The interests underlying the first amendment protection of free-
dom of speech are undermined by all government actions that re-
strict the expression of particular ideas regardless of the govern-
ment's purpose. Even when innocently motivated, such restrictions
impede the functioning of the "marketplace of ideas. '7 2 Addition-
ally, such restrictions hinder the progress toward greater knowl-
edge that comes from the clashing of opposing views and diminish
the public's capacity for self-government by depriving it of
information."s
Moreover, invidious government motivation serves as an impor-
tant limiting factor in equal protection analysis in a way that is
unnecessary in first amendment analysis. Equal protection juris-
prudence focuses on the distribution of economic and social bene-
fits among the members of society. Arguably, every law that per-
mits that distribution to be unequal has a discriminatory effect
upon groups that, for reasons unrelated to the law, receive a
smaller share of social and economic goods. 4 If a discriminatory
effect alone triggered heightened scrutiny, equal protection juris-
prudence would cause a drastic reordering of American society. A
vast number of laws that merely permit the unequal distribution of
resources among different ethnic, sexual, or religious groups would
be invalid. In the absence of compelling reasons to do otherwise,
Feeney, 445 U.S. 901; Davis, 426 U.S. 229. The Court found it necessary to reassert the
importance of motivation in order to avoid the necessity of applying strict scrutiny to count-
less laws which coincidentally have a differential impact on members of protected groups.
72. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
73. See supra note 65 for a discussion of the purposes underlying the constitutional guar-
antee of freedom of speech.
74. For example, even Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee (17)
(1982), has a discriminatory effect insofar as it permits employers to hire or promote more
qualified candidates over members of protected groups, and, for unrelated cultural and edu-
cational reasons, those more qualified candidates tend to be white males.
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the courts would be required to enforce redistribution of goods and
privileges. The courts so far have been unwilling to undertake such
massive social restructuring. Instead, they have searched for a
principle that will allow them to invalidate only the most objec-
tionable of discriminatory laws. Improper legislative purpose has
been chosen as that principle. 5
Finally, many of the reasons for special judicial hostility to dis-
criminatory legislative purpose in equal protection analysis do not
apply in first amendment analysis. A legislative preference for one
group of people over another typically involves a desire by the ma-
jority of legislators to reserve benefits or privileges for particular
private interests. In contrast, a legislative preference for one form
of speech over another usually involves a legislative judgment that
one form of speech is more likely than the other to promote the
welfare of society as a whole. Thus, discriminatory legislative moti-
vation in the speech context, while it may be misguided, usually
represents an effort to achieve the public good rather than an ef-
fort to benefit a particular private group. Moreover, even if a legis-
lature were bent on discriminating against a particular group, it
would be difficult for the legislature to use a speech restriction to
do so. Particular ideas are rarely so closely linked to a specific ra-
cial, sexual, religious, or economic group that a legislative prefer-
ence for the idea necessarily translates into a preference for the
group.7 6
These concerns underlying the emphasis on discriminatory pur-
pose in equal protection analysis are not present in the first
amendment context. Content-based speech restrictions discrimi-
nate against ideas rather than groups of people. In the absence of a
government-enforced restructuring of society, scarcity of resources
compels inequality among people; no practical limitations compel
the inequality of ideas. The government can treat all ideas equally
75. Scholars disagree concerning the kind of legislative purpose that should be considered
improper. According to one view, legislators violate the equal protection guarantee when
their motive for enacting legislation is a simple preference for members of their own group,
instead of a desire to benefit the public as a whole. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences and
the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984). Under another view, legislators may per-
missibly seek to benefit special groups, as long as they refrain from harming members of
groups who lack effective access to the political process. See J. ELY, supra note 64, at 73-179.
76. The exception to this generalization is a legislative preference for speech aimed at
defaming or harming a particular group. An enacted preference for speech that defames a
group over other forms of speech, e.g., a reduced postage rate for anti-Semitic publications,
would involve a preference for one group over another. See Sunstein, supra note 75 (discuss-
ing the relevance of discriminatory legislative motivation in constitutional adjudication).
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without engaging in social reorganization. Accordingly, it is unnec-
essary in first amendment analysis to limit judicial scrutiny to laws
passed with an improper governmental purpose. Instead, any law
that effectively prefers one set of ideas over another should be sub-
jected to judicial inquiry regardless of the government's motivation
in enacting that law."
The discriminatory effect of the subscriber requirement for sec-
ond-class mailing rates is twofold. First, the subscriber require-
ment denies the low rate to publications designed primarily for ad-
vertising purposes. Second, the subscriber requirement makes the
low rate available to publications whose recipients voluntarily re-
quest, and in many cases pay for, mailed copies. These effects ar-
guably constitute content discrimination against commercial
speech and against a category of speech whose content is defined
derivatively based upon the preferences of publication readers, or,
in other words, reader-disfavored speech. Commercial speech is a
content category with its own analysis and standard of review.7 1
Whether the discriminatory effect on reader-disfavored speech is
based on the content of that speech is a more difficult question.
2. Reader-Disfavored Publications as a Content-Based Category
The distinction created by the regulations between reader-pre-
ferred and reader-disfavored publications is a content-based dis-
tinction. The central criterion for favored postal rate treatment is
reader valuation of or preference for a publication as expressed
through readers' subscriptions to that publication. Presumably,
readers value or prefer certain publications because of the content
of those publications. Therefore, the category of publications that
readers disfavor is actually a content-based category. This category
differs from more easily recognized content-based categories only
because the content accorded special treatment is defined deriva-
tively by the preferences of readers.
The category of speech defined here, reader-disfavored speech, is
77. The purpose of the government action is relevant at a later stage of first amendment
analysis. Once the appropriate standard of review is selected and applied, the government
purpose must be identified and evaluated for its importance. See infra notes 88-93, 95-98
and accompanying text. The chosen means must also be evaluated for their effectiveness in
furthering that purpose. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text. However, in deter-
mining whether a restriction is content-based or content-neutral, the initial stage in first
amendment analysis, government purpose should not be of great significance.
78. See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
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-akin to "offensive speech." "Offensive speech" is speech that does
not meet the legal standard for obscenity but is restricted because
it is offensive to most members of society.7 9 Supreme Court cases
dealing with offensive speech treat it as a distinct content category,
subject to its own standard of review. 0 Certainly, some publica-
tions that readers do not subscribe to or request are unpopular be-
cause readers .find them offensive. Because speech that is offensive
to its audience is treated as a content category, the broader cate-
gory of speech which is unappealing to its audience for a variety of
reasons is also a content category.
However, there is a significant difference between offensive
speech and reader-disfavored speech. The category of reader-disfa-
vored publications is defined wholly by the actual preferences of
readers, whatever those preferences may be. Yet offensive speech is
not defined wholly by the reaction of a particular audience. In-
stead, it is defined by general norms which are presumed to be
widely socially acceptable by the government body imposing the
restriction."' For example, in Federal Communications Commis-
sion v. Pacifica Foundation,82 the Federal Communications Com-
mission issued an order declaring that a particular broadcast was
"indecent" and "profane", although the agency did not conduct a
survey of listeners to determine whether the majority had actually
been offended.
This difference could be used to support an argument that the
heightened scrutiny given to content-based restrictions is appropri-
ate only when the restriction applies to speech whose content is
targeted by the government itself and not when the restriction
merely recognizes content choices made by the public without gov-
ernment interference. Under this view, the targeting of a particular
79. "Offensive speech" includes coarse language and movies with sexual content. See, e.g.,
F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50 (1976); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
80. See cases cited supra note 79.
81. For example, in affirming the conviction of an individual based on the written mes-
sage displayed on his jacket, the Court of Appeals of California concluded that "[iut was
certainly reasonably foreseeable that such conduct might cause others to rise up to commit a
violent act against the person of the defendant or attempt to forceably remove his jacket."
People v. Cohen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 99-100, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 506 (1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 15
(1971). The California court did not inquire whether on-lookers were actually offended.
Rather, it applied its own standard of offensiveness to the speech in question and assumed
that that standard was shared by a majority of those affected by the defendant's speech.
82. 438 U.S. 726, 739 (1978).
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content category by the government itself raises special first
amendment concerns. The Court has lent support to this position
by explaining that the "government may not grant the use of a
forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny its use to
less favored . . . views. And it may not select which issues are
worth discussing or debating in public facilities. '8 3 Where the gov-
ernment leaves the selection to the intended audience of the
speech, it is arguably only facilitating the natural functioning of
the "marketplace of ideas."
The problem with the preceding argument is that it assumes a
world of static ideas and beliefs. If it were safe to assume that the
relative popularity of beliefs would never change, even without
government interference, then it would not be troublesome for the
government to benefit popular views and burden unpopular ones.
However, the premise of our "profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open"8 4 is that public acceptance of ideas does
changes5 and should be allowed to change freely. Government-im-
posed restrictions on speech that reflect current public acceptance
of ideas handicap the important process of change. They hinder
the dissemination of ideas that might eventually gain widespread
acceptance in the absence of government restrictions. Therefore,
speech restrictions which discriminate between popular and un-
popular speech, as these postal regulations do, should be treated as
content-based. Consequently, they should be subject to a height-
ened standard of scrutiny.8
6
83. Police Dep't v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
84. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
85. Justice Holmes observed that "time has upset many fighting faiths." Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
86. Three lower courts, confronting speech restrictions which established similar distinc-
tions between popular and unpopular speech, concluded that such restrictions must be
treated as content-based and therefore evaluated under exacting standards. See Rhode Is-
land Nat'l Women's Political Caucus v. Rhode Island Lottery Comm'n, 609 F. Supp. 1403,
1412-13 (D.R.I. 1985) (state statute permitting use of lotteries for political fund raising only
by political parties whose gubernatorial candidate received at least five percent of the vote
in the last general election); Spencer v. Herdesty, 571 F. Supp. 444 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (federal
statute granting special third-class bulk mailing rate to statewide political parties but not to
local parties); Greenberg v. Bolger, 497 F. Supp. 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (federal statute grant-
ing third-class bulk mailing rate only to political parties whose presidential candidate re-
ceived more than five percent of the popular vote in the last election). In Greenberg, the
court explained:
To suggest that a regulation that confers benefits on the basis of popularity is not
content-based would require the court to draw an artificial distinction between the
popularity and the substance of an idea. ... To handicap the mailing of campaign
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III. APPLYING THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because the regulations create a content-based distinction, the
next step is to identify and apply the appropriate standard of re-
view. While content-based restrictions generally receive stricter
scrutiny than content-neutral restrictions, 7 the standard of review
for content-based restrictions depends upon the particular content
category involved.8 For example, the standard of review for ob-
scenity is different from the standard applicable to commercial
speech or speech that induces illegal conduct.89 Two standards of
review are applicable to the postal regulations. The subscriber re-
quirement must be evaluated under the standard appropriate for
commercial speech restrictions because it discriminates against
commercial speech. Because the subscriber requirement also dis-
criminates against unpopular or reader-disfavored speech, it must
be reviewed under the standard appropriate for that category.
A. Commercial Speech
In Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council,90 the Supreme Court established that the first amend-
ment protects commercial speech from unwarranted governmental
regulation.91 Constitutional protection for commercial speech is
needed because commercial expression does not merely serve the
economic interest of the speaker, but it provides information that
literature because a political party has not achieved a required level of acceptance is
not different from censoring speech because of its substance.
Id. at 775-76.
87. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
88. See Stone, supra note 64, at 82 n.6 ("The Court has not articulated a single all-em-
bracing standard, but rather has employed several different standards and approaches, in-
cluding categorization, clear and present danger, and variations of the compelling-interest
test.").
89. Compare Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity) with Central Hudson Gas
& Electric Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (commercial speech) and Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (speech inducing illegal conduct).
90. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
91. Id. at 758-70. In prior cases, the Court had indicated that commercial speech received
no first amendment protection. See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (uphold-
ing a conviction for violation of an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation of maga-
zine subscriptions); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (upholding a New York
statute that prohibited the distribution of advertising handbills on city streets). The Court's
shift in position was heralded by the decision in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975),
which reversed a conviction under a Virginia statute banning the circulation of any publica-
tion advertising the availability of abortions. The Court rejected the argument that the pub-
lication at issue was unprotected because it was commercial. Id. at 819.
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helps the public to make important consumer decisions and to un-
derstand the economic functioning of their society.9 2 The Court re-
jected the view underlying most restrictions on commercial speech,
which is that members of the public should be shielded from cer-
tain forms of commercial speech because they are unable to per-
ceive their own best interests and will be swayed by such messages
to act to their own detriment. The Court found that view incom-
patible with the fundamental premises of the first amendment,
noting that constitutional protection for free debate necessarily as-
sumes that the nation's citizens are, on the whole, capable of sort-
ing out the useful from the harmful and the wise from the fool-
ish.9 3 The Court also recognized, however, that commercial speech
is speech proposing a commercial transaction. 4 Therefore, com-
mercial speech may be restricted by legitimate governmental regu-
lation of commercial activity. 5 To accommodate such regulation,
the Constitution affords a lesser degree of protection to commer-
cial speech than to other forms of protected expression. 6
The standard established by the Court for evaluating restrictions
on commercial speech is straightforward. First, commercial
messages are wholly unprotected if they are deceptive97 or relate to
illegal activity.98 Second, if a commercial communication does not
fall into either of those categories, the government must assert a
substantial interest to be achieved by its restriction.9 Last, the re-
92. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62
(1980); Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 763-65.
93. In Virginia Pharmacy Bd., the Court explained that "people will perceive their own
best interests if only they are well enough informed, and ... the best means to that end is
to open the channels of communication, rather than to close them." 425 U.S. at 770. The
Court restated this idea in Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977):
[I]t seems peculiar to deny the consumer, on the ground that the information is in-
complete, at least some of the relevant information needed to reach an informed deci-
sion. The alternative-the prohibition of advertising-serves only to restrict the in-
formation that flows to consumers. Moreover, the argument assumes that the public
is not sophisticated enough to realize the limits of advertising, and that the public is
better kept in ignorance than trusted with correct but incomplete information. We
suspect the argument rests on an underestimation of the public. In any event, we
view as dubious any argument that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.
Id. at 374-75 (footnote omitted); see also Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85,
92 (1977).
94. Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 762.
95. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 468 U.S. 60, 64 (1982).
96. Id. at 64-65; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63.
97. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13, 15-16 (1979); Ohralik v. State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 464-65 (1978).
98. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 383 (1973).
99. Bolger, 468 U.S. at 68-69; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-66. Legislative purpose
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striction must be narrowly tailored to further the asserted govern-
mental interest. It must directly and effectively promote the gov-
ernment's goal, and it must not be broader than necessary to
promote that goal. 00
The Postal Service's subscriber requirement for reduced rates is
not limited to deceptive communications or to communications
proposing an illegal transaction. Therefore, the subscriber require-
ment cannot be upheld on the ground that it affects only unpro-
tected speech.
Determining whether the governmental interest underlying the
subscriber requirement is substantial raises an interesting issue.
The purpose of the requirement is to promote and encourage the
dissemination of noncommercial information and ideas101-a pur-
pose that amounts to an undisguised preference for noncommercial
over commercial speech. 102 The notion that a simple legislative
preference for one form of speech over another could constitute a
substantial government purpose under the Court's commercial
should not be a consideration in determining whether a facially neutral speech restriction is
in fact content-based. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text. Legislative purpose
should be unimportant in deciding which standard of review to apply. Once the appropriate
standard has been selected, however, the application of that standard usually requires a
judicial evaluation of the importance of the legislative purpose. At this stage of the analysis,
rather than earlier, a court should inquire into the possibility that the legislature intention-
ally discriminated between different content categories of speech.
100. Bolger, 468 U.S. at 68-69; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-65.
101. Congress, in the 1970 Postal Service Reorganization Act, and the Postal Service, in
regulations issued pursuant to that Act, established lower second class mailing rates with
the goal of encouraging the dissemination of useful and educational information and ideas.
See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. The Postal Service regulations defining the
second class of mailable matter are designed to define the class so that it reflects the cate-
gory of publications which convey such information and ideas. The subscriber requirement
is one of those regulations. See supra notes 3-4. From its first appearance in the Act of 1879,
the subscriber requirement has been thought to exclude publications from the second-class
that do not contain useful ideas and information.
It cannot be argued that the purpose of the subscriber requirement is the conservation of
government resources or the sound fiscal management of the Postal Service. Such purposes
would require only that the availability of the reduced mailing rate be limited in some fash-
ion. These motives do not determine how the limit should be drawn. Indeed, in the absence
of some other purpose, the pursuit of these goals would lead to the elimination of the subsi-
dized rate entirely, not merely to its limitation to a certain category of publications.
102. Congress made that preference clear in the language and legislative history of the
Act of Mar. 3, 1879, ch. 180, 20 Stat. 355. Section 14 of the 1879 Act expressly provided that
"publications designed for advertising purposes" were to be excluded from the second-class.
Id. at 359. During the debates prior to the enactment of the legislation, one Congressman
commented that the Act would "keep from the mails a vast bulk of matter . . . which is
made up simply of advertising concerns not intended for public education." 8 CONG. REc.
2135 (1879) (statement of Rep. Money).
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speech test is somewhat troublesome at first. However, by granting
a lesser degree of constitutional protection to commercial speech,
the Supreme Court has made it clear that commercial speech occu-
pies a "subordinate position in the scale of first amendment val-
ues." 103 Moreover, as the Court has noted, commercial speech, as
"the offspring of economic self-interest," is less likely than other
forms of speech to be deterred or chilled by government regula-
tion.104 Presumably then, legislatures and agencies, as well as
courts, are entitled to prefer noncommercial expression over com-
mercial expression.
However, the subscriber requirement is not narrowly drawn to
further the purpose of preferring noncommercial speech over com-
mercial speech. The regulations do not impose a disparate burden
on advertising publications alone. The subscriber requirement is
overinclusive, bringing within its reach local newspapers and politi-
cal and religious publications. It is also underinclusive because by
its terms the second-class rate is available for many commercial
publications, such as mail-away catalogues, which are requested by
recipients. Indeed, a more closely tailored regulation already exists.
A separate Postal Service regulation denies the reduced mailing
rate to publications that are primarily designed for advertising
purposes.' ° Because that regulation excludes advertising circulars,
mail-away catalogues, and other commercial junk mail from the
103. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456.
104. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977).
105. Section 422.231 of the DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL, supra note 2, which applies to "gen-
eral publications," provides:
Publications Designed for Advertising Purposes. General publications primarily
designed for advertising purposes may not qualify for second-class privileges. These
include, but are not limited to:
a. Publications which contain more than 75% advertising in more than half of the
issues published during any twelve-month period.
b. Publications owned or controlled by individuals and business concerns and con-
ducted as an auxiliary to and essentially for the advancement of any other business or
calling of those who own or control them.
c. Publications that consist principally of advertising and articles about advertisers
in the publication.
d. Publications that have only a token list of subscribers and that print advertise-
ments free for advertisers who pay for copies to be sent to a list of persons furnished
by the advertisers.
e. Publications published under a license from individuals or organizations and
that feature other businesses of the licensor.
Id. The regulation concerning "requester publications," contains similar explicit restrictions
on the commercial purposes and the amount of advertising permissible in publications qual-
ifying for second-class privileges in that category. See DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL, supra note
2, at § 422.6.
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second-class rate, the subscriber requirement is simply
unnecessary.
B. Reader-Disfavored Publications
The subscriber requirement's effect of discriminating against a
content category defined on the basis of reader preference" 6 can-
not be classified in any previously recognized content category.
Where no special standard has evolved for a particular category of
content, the Supreme Court has required that the restriction be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest." 7
Under the compelling interest standard, the Court conducts a
searching inquiry into the importance of the asserted government
interest in restricting speech and the closeness of the fit between
that interest and the means chosen to accomplish it. The govern-
ment bears a heavy burden of justification for its restriction.108 In
view of the potential dangers inherent in government discrimina-
tion between popular and unpopular speech,10 this is the appro-
priate standard to apply to the subscriber requirement.
Sections 422.6, 422.221, and 422.223 of the Domestic Mail Man-
ual, which contain the subscriber requirement for second-class
postage rates, fall short of this exacting standard. The purpose of
the subscriber requirement-to encourage the dissemination of
ideas and information110-may qualify as compelling."' However,
the subscriber requirement is not narrowly tailored to serve that
purpose. Publications containing ideas and information of the kind
that Congress and the Postal Service intended to encourage are ex-
cluded from the second-class mailing rate when they appear in
publications distributed to persons who have not paid for or specif-
ically requested their copies.
106. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
107. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983);
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 464-65 (1979). Adhoc balancing tests of this sort have been
criticized by some commentators as inappropriate for content-based restrictions. See supra
note 64.
108. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1975) ("The interest advanced must be para-
mount, one of vital importance, and the burden is on the government to show the existence
of such an interest.").
109. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 101.
111. However, the government's implicit value judgment on the relative merits of various
categories of speech may be troubling. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
This article has argued that the Postal Service's subscriber re-
quirement for access to the postal system at reduced second-class
rates violates the first amendment. Because postage fees restrict
access to a public forum, a first amendment issue is raised. A strict
level of scrutiny must be applied because the postage rate regula-
tions discriminate on the basis of content. The regulations do not
survive that scrutiny. The result is that the first amendment pro-
tects what is in essence a property right held by publishers of pub-
lications that are distributed free of charge to nonsubscribers. The
first amendment entitles them to access to the mails at the same
favorable rates accorded to publications that are distributed to
subscribers.

